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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Yaqin Chen petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(the “Board”) denying her request for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under 
Article III of the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  We will deny the petition.   
I. BACKGROUND 
Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, was admitted to the 
United States on a K-1 nonimmigrant visa in 2003.  Although Chen’s visa expired on 
February 20, 2004, she has remained in the United States, where she has married and 
given birth to two children.  On August 2, 2007, four months after the birth of her first 
child and while pregnant with her second, Chen filed an application for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under CAT.  She alleged that, by giving birth to 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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two children, she would be viewed as having violated China’s family planning policy 
and, therefore, if removed to China, would be subject to severe persecution such as 
sterilization, heavy fines, or imprisonment.     
On September 10, 2007, Chen was interviewed by an asylum officer, Susan Perez, 
with the assistance of an interpreter provided by Chen.  A written summary of the 
interview was prepared and read back to Chen, and she initialed each page and signed it 
under oath.  The sworn summary of Chen’s statements to the asylum officer certified that 
she had studied and served as a midwife in China for one year of internship and one 
additional year of work.  Chen said that, as a midwife, she assisted doctors in performing 
at least ten abortions, of which five or six were done by force.  She further stated that her 
assistance consisted of, among other things, handing “equipment” to the doctors 
performing the operations.  (A.R. at 564.)  Chen acknowledged that she knew some of the 
abortions with which she assisted were compelled because the patients involved were 
forced onto the operating table and, after the operations, she helped carry them out of the 
surgical room and talked with them.  Chen also disclosed that she assisted doctors in 
performing sterilizations on two occasions.  And while Chen did not describe precisely 
how she assisted with the sterilizations, she did testify that she knew the sterilizations 
were compelled because some of the patients were unwilling and some would be crying.  
Chen acknowledged that she was uncomfortable participating in some of the procedures.  
Indeed, she noted that she would “[s]ometimes cry in sympathy with women … but they 
had to go through with [the] operation and so [she] would pat [their] shoulders to comfort 
them.”  (A.R. at 565.)  Despite any sympathy she may have felt, Chen said that had she 
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ever refused to assist in compelled birth control procedures, she would not have been able 
to become a full midwife and would lose her job.   
The Department of Homeland Security charged Chen with being removable under 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), for overstaying her visa.  At a hearing on July 14, 2008, Chen 
offered testimony before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”).  That testimony, however, 
contradicted key facts contained in the sworn summary of her interview with Officer 
Perez.  Notably, Chen departed from her prior statement that she had assisted in five or 
six compelled abortions.  She testified that government officials from China’s family 
planning unit did not allow her to be involved in forced abortions and, therefore, she only 
observed the procedures.  Chen testified that, “[a]t most, what we would do is give the 
nurses gloves or syringes” that contained “regular painkillers.”  (A.R. at 298, 299.)  
When asked by the IJ whether she could corroborate her story with any documents such 
as a curriculum description for the midwife program, Chen responded that she was 
unlikely to be able to obtain documents from her school in China.   
On March 29, 2013, the IJ denied Chen’s application for asylum and withholding 
of removal.  That determination was based, in large part, on an adverse credibility 
determination due to Chen’s “implausible and inconsistent testimony.”  (A.R. at 65.)  
Also, of particular importance was the IJ’s conclusion that, as a result of assisting with 
compelled birth control procedures, Chen was herself a persecutor and thus barred from 
receiving asylum or withholding of removal.  The IJ reasoned that Chen “[f]ail[ed] to 
rebut the evidence of her ineligibility based on the persecutor bar, by a preponderance of 
the evidence … .”  (A.R. at 65.)  The IJ also concluded that Chen failed to show that she 
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would more likely than not be tortured upon her return to China.  Subsequently, on 
August 25, 2014, the Board dismissed Chen’s appeal of the IJ’s decision.  She then filed 
this timely petition for review.   
II. DISCUSSION1 
A. ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL 
We must address two questions in determining whether the IJ properly denied 
Chen’s application for asylum and withholding of removal: first, whether the IJ correctly 
concluded that Chen engaged in persecution while in China, thus triggering the 
“persecutor bar”; and second, whether substantial evidence supports the IJ’s 
determination that Chen failed to rebut the application of that bar.  In our estimation, the 
                                              
1 The Board had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) and 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(b)(3) and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  “We 
review the [Board]’s legal determinations de novo, subject to the principles of deference 
articulated in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).”  
Catwell v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2010).  While we have not previously 
stated if this standard of review covers the question of “whether an alien’s conduct could 
render her a ‘persecutor’ as that term is statutorily defined,” Suzhen Meng v. Holder, 770 
F.3d 1071, 1073 (2d Cir. 2014), we need not decide that now because, whether we apply 
a deferential standard of review or simply review the matter de novo, the Board’s legal 
determination in this case certainly stands.  We review factual findings under the 
substantial evidence standard.  Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Under that standard, “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).  Stated differently, we “must uphold the [agency’s] factual findings if 
they are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record 
considered as a whole.”  Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 534 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), superseded on other grounds by statute, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (replacing the “motivated, at least in part” standard with the “one 
central reason” standard).  Consequently, the agency’s findings “must be upheld unless 
the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Abdille v. 
Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir. 2001).   
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IJ correctly concluded that the persecutor bar applies and substantial evidence supports 
the IJ’s determination that Chen failed to rebut such application.   
Asylum is a form of discretionary relief that allows an otherwise removable alien 
to remain and work in the United States if she can demonstrate that she is a “refugee.”2  
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b).  The burden of proof is plainly on the 
applicant to establish eligibility for asylum.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B).  To meet that 
burden, the petitioner must, with specific and credible evidence, establish past 
persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground, or a “well-founded fear” of 
future persecution on account of a protected ground.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b).  The “well-
founded fear of persecution” standard contains subjective and objective components.  The 
subjective component requires the applicant to “present candid, credible, and sincere 
testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution.”  Dankam v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 
113, 123 (4th Cir. 2007) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).  To satisfy the 
objective component, the applicant must present “specific, concrete facts that would 
cause a reasonable person in like circumstances … to fear persecution.”  Id. (omissions in 
original) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).  “The testimony of the 
applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but 
only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is 
                                              
2 The Immigration and Nationality Act defines “refugee” as an alien who is 
“unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail … herself of the 
protection of, [her native] country because of [past] persecution or a well-founded fear of 
[future] persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13.   
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persuasive, and refers to specific facts … .”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B).  In addition, the IJ 
“may weigh the credible testimony along with the other evidence of record.”  Id.   
Withholding of removal is a form of mandatory relief that prevents the removal of 
an alien to a country where “the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened … because 
of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”  Id. § 1231(b)(3).  Notably, the standard for establishing a claim of 
withholding of removal is higher than the standard for asylum.  Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y 
Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 348 (3d Cir. 2008).  “As with asylum, [the applicant] must show that 
any persecution is on account of a protected ground, but in addition, she must show that 
such persecution is ‘more likely than not’ to occur.”  Id.   
Both asylum and withholding of removal are subject to a statutory “persecutor 
bar,” which renders an alien ineligible for either form of relief if she has “ordered, 
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i); see Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 513 
(2009) (“An alien who fears persecution in his homeland and seeks refugee status in this 
country is barred from obtaining that relief if he has persecuted others.”).   
Forced abortions and sterilization are, by law, defined as persecution.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42).3  This case requires us to determine whether Chen’s acts of handing 
                                              
3 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) provides in relevant part: 
[A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to 
undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted 
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“equipment” to doctors performing those procedures constituted assistance or 
participation in such persecution.  Because we have not articulated our own test to 
determine when an applicant has “assisted” or “otherwise participated” in persecution, we 
turn to other circuits for guidance.   
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit employs a four-part test 
to assess whether the persecutor bar applies: first, the alien must have been involved in an 
act of persecution; second, a nexus must be shown between the persecution and the 
victim’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion; third, if the alien did not herself incite, order, or actively carry out the 
persecution, then her conduct must have assisted the persecution; and fourth, the alien 
must have had sufficient knowledge that her actions may assist in persecution to make 
those actions culpable.  Suzhen Meng v. Holder, 770 F.3d 1071, 1074 (2d Cir. 2014).  
The Fourth Circuit utilizes a two-part test: first, whether there is a “nexus between the 
alien’s actions and the persecution of others, such that the alien can fairly be 
characterized as having actually assisted or otherwise participated in that persecution”; 
and second, a showing that the alien acted with scienter or with “some level of prior or 
contemporaneous knowledge that the persecution was being conducted.”  Quitanilla v. 
                                                                                                                                                  
for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure ... shall be 
deemed to have been persecuted on account of political 
opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or 
she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to 
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be 
deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account 
of political opinion.   
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Holder, 758 F.3d 570, 577 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Sixth 
Circuit also applies a two-part test, which is very similar to the one just stated: first, there 
must “be some nexus between the alien’s actions and the persecution of others, such that 
the alien can fairly be characterized as having actually assisted or otherwise participated 
in that persecution”; and, second, “if such a nexus is shown, the alien must have acted 
with scienter; the alien must have had some level of contemporaneous knowledge that the 
persecution was being conducted.”  Abdallahi v. Holder, 690 F.3d 467, 476 (6th Cir. 
2012).  The Ninth Circuit likewise employs a two-part test: first, “whether the petitioner’s 
involvement was active or passive”; and second, “whether the petitioner’s acts were 
material to the persecutory end.”  Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(relying on Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzalez, 449 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Chen 
v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The standard for determining 
whether an asylum applicant is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal due to 
assistance or participation in persecution is a particularized, fact-specific inquiry into 
whether the applicant’s personal conduct was merely indirect, peripheral and 
inconsequential association or was active, direct and integral to the underlying 
persecution.”); Castañeda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 21-22 (1st Cir. 2007) (en 
banc) (finding that knowledge, or scienter, is required to impose persecutor bar); Singh v. 
Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 739-41 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing the nexus requirement).   
If the government asserts that the persecutor bar applies to an alien’s application 
for asylum or withholding of removal, it bears the burden of making a prima facie 
showing that the evidence supports that conclusion.  See Quitanilla, 758 F.3d at 579 
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(upholding an Immigration Judge’s decision that the government had “satisfied its prima 
facie burden of showing [the applicant’s] involvement in the persecution of others”); Xu 
Sheng Gao v. Att’y Gen., 500 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[O]nce the government has 
satisfied its initial burden of demonstrating that the persecutor bar applies, the burden 
would then shift to the applicant to disprove knowledge.”); Castañeda-Castillo, 488 F.3d 
at 21 (“[O]nce the government introduced evidence of the applicant’s association with 
persecution, it then became Castañeda’s burden to disprove that he was engaged in 
persecution.”);4 cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (“If the evidence indicates that one or more of 
the grounds for mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply, [such as the 
persecutor bar,] the alien shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that such grounds do not apply.”).  Once the bar is triggered, an applicant has 
the opportunity and obligation to rebut it.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).   
Most recently, in Suzhen Meng v. Holder, the Second Circuit held that the 
persecutor bar applied to an applicant for asylum and withholding of removal who had 
“assisted” in persecution by reporting pregnant women to Chinese authorities knowing 
that, as a result of the reports, a number of those women would be subjected to forced 
abortions or sterilizations.  770 F.3d at 1074-75.  Similarly, in Xie v. INS, the same court 
stated that when “the conduct was active and had direct consequences for the victims” – 
as opposed to conduct that “was tangential to the acts of oppression and passive in 
                                              
4 Castañeda relied on the burden of proof provision in 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(c)(2)(ii), which applies to asylum applications filed before April 1, 1997.  
Because Chen’s application was filed after that date, her case is governed by 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1240.8(d), which contains similar language with respect to the proper burden of proof.   
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nature” – then such conduct qualifies as persecution.  434 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2006).  
Applying that standard, Xie held that a petitioner who had worked as a driver for a 
Chinese family planning unit and had “transported pregnant women to hospitals in the 
locked back of a van, against their will, so that county officials could perform forced 
abortions on them,” was subject to the persecutor bar because the conduct was active and 
had direct consequences for the victims.  Id. at 138, 143.  
In Weng v. Holder, by contrast, the court held that the persecutor bar did not apply 
to a nursing assistant who provided post-surgical medical care in China to women who 
had undergone forced abortions.  562 F.3d 510, 512-15 (2d Cir. 2009).  On one occasion, 
the nursing assistant sat outside the locked door of a room where women awaiting forced 
abortions were being held until delayed doctors arrived to perform the procedure.  In 
concluding that the persecutor bar did not apply, the Second Circuit observed that the 
petitioner’s provision of post-surgical care did not contribute to the abortions.  Id. at 515.  
As for the petitioner’s guarding women facing forced abortions, that one-time occurrence 
was deemed to have “deviated markedly from her routine duties” and lasted only ten 
minutes before petitioner, in fact, helped one of the women escape, which resulted in the 
petitioner losing her job.  Id.   
Similarly, in Yan Yan Lin v. Holder, the Second Circuit held that the persecutor 
bar did not apply to an applicant who did not participate in the abortion procedure itself 
but did perform examinations, such as ultrasounds and other prenatal examinations, 
which were sometimes used to determine an unborn child’s position in order for the 
doctor to perform a forced abortion.  584 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2009).  The Yan Yan Lin court 
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noted, “[t]he kinds of examinations in which Lin assisted (e.g., ultrasounds) are given to 
all pregnant women, whether the pregnancy is scheduled to result in a live birth, a 
voluntary abortion, or a forced abortion.  The exams are more akin to routine patient care 
than a protocol specific to forced abortions.”  Id. at 81.  The court also reasoned that, as 
in Weng, the examinations in Yan Yan Lin “did not contribute to, or facilitate, the victims’ 
forced abortions in any direct or active way because they did not cause the abortions, nor 
did they make it more likely that they would occur.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and 
brackets omitted); cf. Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (“For instance, 
a cook or a plumber who works at a prison may be integral to the functioning of the 
facility, but his duties are hardly integral to the persecution that might occur within the 
prison’s walls.”).  When assessing the petitioner’s conduct as a whole, Yan Yan Lin also 
took into account a “redemptive act” taken by the petitioner when she helped a woman 
escape the hospital prior to a forced abortion and determined that this weighed against the 
application of the persecutor bar.  Id. at 81-82.   
In light of those precedents, we conclude that the IJ correctly applied the 
persecutor bar to Chen’s conduct.  More specifically, using the Second Circuit’s test,5 we 
conclude that: first, Chen participated in multiple compelled birth control procedures, 
which are acts of persecution, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)); second, there is a nexus between 
those acts of persecution and the victims’ political opinion, id.; third, at the very least, 
                                              
5 Our conclusion would be the same if we were to apply the more compressed 
two-step tests articulated by other circuit courts.   
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Chen’s conduct assisted the persecution; and fourth, Chen was aware that her assistance 
contributed to compelled abortions and sterilizations.   
Chen argues that the persecutor bar should not apply because her conduct was at 
most only “tangential” and “passive accommodation” of the conduct of others.  (Opening 
Br. at 23.)  She asserts that she is like the petitioner in Weng who provided post-surgical 
care and therefore did not materially contribute to the abortions.  But that is patently not 
so.  Unlike the petitioner in Weng, Chen’s act of handing equipment to doctors 
performing compelled birth control procedures was active, not passive, and it occurred 
during the procedures, not after the fact.  Rather than being one or two steps removed 
from the abortions or sterilizations, Chen played a direct role in effectuating them.  
Indeed, even Chen’s revised version of her involvement in the procedures – “giv[ing] the 
nurses gloves or syringes” – involves active contribution to forced abortions.  (Opening 
Br. at 24.)   
Chen’s level of participation is also distinguishable from the petitioner in Yan Yan 
Lin, who performed ultrasounds on women who were about to undergo forced birth 
control procedures.  Unlike that petitioner, Chen’s assistance during such procedures 
contributed directly to the persecution.  In addition, unlike the petitioner whose acts were 
highlighted in Yan Yan Lin, Chen was not engaged in the sort of prenatal care that women 
would normally seek out during their pregnancies.  And while Chen may have expressed 
sympathy to the women who underwent forced birth control procedures, nothing in the 
record suggests that she took any redemptive steps, such as helping victims escape or 
otherwise trying to prevent the commission of such persecution.  On balance, Chen’s 
 14 
 
statements in her application and even at the hearing indicate that she knowingly, 
willingly, and culpably participated in forcible sterilizations and abortions.  As a result, 
the persecutor bar was triggered and she bore the burden of rebutting it.   
In addition, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Chen failed to 
rebut the persecutor bar.  There is no infirmity in the IJ’s conclusion that Chen was not 
credible and had failed to adduce any corroborating evidence.  Chen told Officer Perez 
that she had assisted in abortions “10 or more times,” of which “5 or 6” were done by 
force.  (A.R. at 563-64.)  Moreover, she told Officer Perez that she had assisted doctors in 
performing two compelled sterilizations.  The transcript of her interview with Officer 
Perez clearly discloses that, in her capacity as a midwife, Chen assisted doctors in 
performing forced birth control procedures by handing the doctors equipment necessary 
to effectuate those procedures.  But Chen changed her testimony when she appeared 
before the IJ.  She said that Chinese family planning officials prevented her from even 
being in the room when forced birth control procedures were performed.  And then she 
contradicted her own hearing testimony, stating that there actually were times when she 
was in the room during those procedures but, “[a]t most, what we would do is give the 
nurses gloves or syringes.”6  (A.R. at 298.)  Chen thus made a series of significantly 
                                              
6 We also note that Chen’s position remains inconsistent on appeal.  She 
acknowledges that she witnessed about five or six forced abortions.  Yet, she also asserts 
that she could not be present in the room for forced birth control procedures and she 
found out about the forced nature of such procedures by talking to patients after the 
procedures had finished.  While this does not impact whether the IJ made a proper 
credibility determination, such inconsistency exemplifies Chen’s inability to credibly 
settle on a consistent narrative. 
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inconsistent statements that the IJ could rightly view as undermining her credibility on 
the persecutor-bar issue.   
We also agree with the IJ that Chen’s failure to adduce any documentary evidence 
to corroborate her altered testimony is pertinent to the issues before us.   As we noted in 
Sandie v. Attorney General, aliens such as Chen can reasonably be expected to support 
testimony that is central to their claim with corroborating evidence that is subject to 
verification.  562 F.3d 246, 252 (3d Cir. 2009).  Given Chen’s shifting story, such 
corroboration was called for.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (“The testimony of the 
applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but 
only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is 
persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a 
refugee.”).  But Chen has provided neither corroboration nor a satisfactory explanation 
for her failure to do so.  There is no official summary of her curriculum or job duties, nor 
any other document that could support her claim that prospective and newly-minted 
midwives from her school were not permitted to be in the room for forced birth control 
procedures.  She simply states that she does not believe she could obtain corroborating 
evidence.  That does not suffice, and we will not disturb the IJ’s conclusion on this point.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (“No court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact 
with respect to availability of corroborating evidence … unless the court finds … that a 
reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is 
unavailable.”).   
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B. DENIAL OF RELIEF UNDER THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
Chen argued in her opening brief that the IJ’s denial of her application for relief 
under CAT was deficient.  Specifically, she asserted that the IJ failed to address a letter 
from her father in which he said that an official who worked at the village birth control 
office told him that Chen could face sterilization and a heavy fine if she returned to 
China.  In response, the government argues that Chen did not raise this claim of error 
before the Board and thus may not raise it in her petition for review.  Chen’s counsel 
conceded at oral argument that Chen’s claim regarding the letter was not raised before the 
Board.  Accordingly, she has waived her right to rely on the IJ’s failure to consider the 
letter as evidence that the IJ did not adequately consider her CAT claim.  To the extent 
Chen attacks the IJ’s denial of her application for relief under CAT more generally, we 
cannot conclude that the record evidence, including the letter, compels a conclusion that 
it is more likely than not that Chen will be tortured if removed to China.  As a result, we 
will deny her petition as it relates to relief under CAT.   
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.   
